"Knowledge is what is, values are what ought to be."

John Martin writes in his post concering the obviously misled individuals who make up the environmental movement and the animal activist movement that "dedicating one's self (sic) to the greater good and seeking to make a positive change are among the most redeeming of human qualities." He then continues, in a derogatory and demeaning fashion to contradict himself profoundly. How?

By his derogation, he seems to indicate that both groups are not "seeking the greater good" and/or not working for a "positive change." Knowledge, real knowledge, tends to activate for positive change, in any given situation, if it discovers either discrepancy or negativity in said situation when seen in the light of that knowledge. When this occurs the onus shifts and falls within the realm of values. Now we are in an area where what "ought to be" is salient, if what is is discrepant from what ought to be in the light of knowledge. In our time, we are especially reliant on knowledge gained from science (the examining and scrutiny of what is).

I would hope that Mr. Martin is familiar with the concept of sentience. Humans discovered quite early on that they feel pain. And by corollary, the lack of pain (perhaps contentment and/or happiness could be substituted here). While it may be difficult to define, in no uncertain terms, exactly what contentment and happines are, it is less difficult to define pain. For such definition one simple way is to observe a being's response to a stimulus. If it seeks to avoid that stimulus, it is defensible to conceive that the stimulus causes discomfort or pain to some degree. The obverse is also true. If a being is obviously moving away from a stimulus, situational or otherwise, it may be postulated that that stimulus is causing pain to some degree.

In my experience, I have never discovered (or even heard of) a sentient being that seeks out boiling water or any lethal heat for its comfort or pleasure. If a crab is placed next to an open body of boiling water, I am willing to bet that it will move away from that body. At the point that it does, it behoves me to accede to its sentience.

My question for Mr. Martin now becomes, "Where do we place the line that indicates which setience is valid and which is not?" Is human sentience valuable (values are what ought to be) and crustacean sentience invaluable? What about all sentient beings? We know very well when a dog or cat is experiencing pain. That is to say that we validate their sentience. We also know that both will avoid situations that they deem to be presumably (on their part) painful. We are also aware that cows feel pain and that they, too, avoid situations that are deemed to be potentially painful.

My question to John Martin here is, "Has he ever seen the pandemonium in the chutes at an abatoir (probably more expressive to read here "slaughterhouse")? I wonder what causes that reaction!

Any individual who indicates that certain examples of sentience are valid and others are not, is in a very difficult ethical and moral conundrum (values are what ought to be-when seen in the light of scientific knowledge). The examples of actions based on this falacious discrepancy are obvious. Or, if they are not, should be.

I wonder if Mr. Martin has been to see the Black Forest of Germany. Mr. Martin, the loonies with skate boards under their arms were too late and now that forest is no longer there for you to see. I would suggest that you hurry out to an oldgrowth forest in B.C. because they are disappearing too fast for you to delay. Oh, and take your camera, so that you can show them to your children and they can show them to their children and they can show them to their children and their children's children. However, that may be too optimistic with crimonologists like you around.

Barry Faires
B.A. in English and Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, Master of Divinity: Naropa University, Boulder Colorado (North America's only Buddhist University), M.A. in Psychology